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Abstract
Subjective uncertainty is characterized by ambiguity if the decision maker has an
imprecise knowledge of the probabilities of payo relevant events. In such an instance,
the decision maker’s beliefs are better represented by a set of probability functions than
by a unique probability function. An ambiguity averse decision maker adjusts his
choice on the side of caution in response to his imprecise knowledge of the odds. This
paper attempts a (selective) survey of some of the achievements of the research pro-
gram which has analyzed important economic phenomena using a methodology that
departs from standard paradigm by explicitly allowing for ambiguity aversion. We
specifically look at applications, and implications, of ambiguity aversion in three areas:
design of bilateral economic contracts, the trade in financial contracts and financial
markets and finally, strategic decision making in auctions. We also indicate the possible
relevance of these findings to recent research in AI. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All
rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility maximization (SEU) [17] is the
received paradigm used for modeling decision making under subjective un-
certainty in economics. A main implication of SEU is that a decision maker
(DM) behaves as if her subjective assessment of likelihoods of uncertain events
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may be represented precisely by a unique probability distribution. However,
experimental evidence ever since Ellsberg [5] has shown this to be a palpably
untrue description of behavior under uncertainty. It is often the case that a
DM’s knowledge about the likelihood of contingent events is consistent with
more than one probability distribution. If you were to ask someone about the
likelihood of a given eventuality, the answer you typically hear is ‘between x%
and y%’, ‘rather than a crisp, ‘z%’. But, does how precisely she knows the
relevant odds, influence the choice of the typical DM? It does: DMs choose
relatively conservatively in situations where information about the odds is
ambiguous in the sense that a relatively wide range of odds is consistent with
her knowledge. As Ellsberg had observed, imprecise information aected his
experimental subjects in a consistent fashion: most preferred to bet on events
with unambiguous rather than ambiguous odds (including, Savage himself!).
And, he reported, even when faced with the evidence that this was inconsistent
with SEU, most stood their ground, ‘‘because it seems to them the sensible way
to behave’’. People adjusting their decisions depending on how well they know
the relevant odds and acting with greater wariness the more vague their
knowledge, is a commonly observed attitude, and has been named ambiguity
aversion.
While there is a vast literature on ambiguity aversion (see [1]), and indeed of
the many other departures from SEU, that convincingly establish their im-
portance in laboratory settings, this work has had little impact on the way that
economics is done. In large part this is because there have been few demon-
strations that economically important phenomena can be understood by using,
and only using, models other than the standard one (SEU). The formidable
recent advances in formulating a very ‘workable’ analytical framework for
handling ambiguity aversion have availed us with a wonderful opportunity of
obtaining such demonstrations. And indeed, recent times have seen a growing
research program which has availed itself of this opportunity. This paper
surveys some of the achievements of this research program. We specifically
look at applications, and implications, of ambiguity aversion in three areas:
design of bilateral economic contracts, the trade in financial markets and
strategic decision making in auctions.
As is perhaps well known to readers of this journal, reasoning under un-
certainty when the knowledge of odds is imprecise is integral to important
problems of AI, including medical diagnosis, machine diagnosis, vision, ro-
botics and natural language understanding. Very often in such contexts, da-
tabases are incomplete (or ‘coarse’) and the ‘hard’ evidence at hand may be
compatible with multiple (probabilistic) beliefs and ‘expert opinions’. Hence, in
such situations ‘input’ required to form adequate Bayesian priors are not
available and closed sets of probabilities are a natural tool for quantifying the
state of prior belief or assessment. And indeed, this insight, developed from
ideas in AI research, inspires at least one understanding of the foundations of
222 S. Mukerji / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 24 (2000) 221–234
the theory of ambiguity aversion in economic situations. 1 More recently, a
significant strand of AI research, led by Michael Wellman, has argued that
economic or market-based systems provide the necessary extensions to form a
general tool for designing distributed intelligent decision making under un-
certainty in multi-agent systems [20,21]. For instance, climate control in large
buildings is an application area where multi-agent systems, and market-
oriented programming in particular, have been reported to be very successful.
Following an earlier work by Hanson [8], who first proposed in the context of
multi-agent systems the idea that markets in uncertain propositions can be used
to coordinate decentralized behavior, Pennock and Wellman [14] have shown
how securities markets can serve to aggregate beliefs of multiple agents with
possibly divergent information sources (see also the work of Nau and others at
Duke on this topic at http://cl26.fuqua.duke.edu/admin/it/test_faculty/
bob_level1.htm). In related research, Wellman and his associates have em-
barked on an innovative and ambitious investigation of the application of the
principles of auction design, developed by economists using tools of game
theory, to the design of multi-agent systems (see http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/peo-
ple/wellman/publications.html#anchor848534 and http://auction.eecs.umich.
edu/). Curiously enough, this recent research invoking the ideas of markets and
strategic behavior to the design of multi-agent systems does not seem to apply
the ideas from the AI research referred to earlier, namely, that closed sets of
probabilities are a natural way of quantifying knowledge bases in contexts of
interest. A contribution of the present survey would be to alert those involved
in the new research initiative to the findings that the nature and outcomes of
market interaction and strategic behavior in auctions can change very dra-
matically if one admits a model of reasoning under uncertainty that incorpo-
rates qualifications which are quite compelling in the context of incomplete
databases. Since such considerations prompt a change in the understanding of
the functioning and design of economic institutions, it may be fruitful to ex-
plore analogous questions in future research in the design of multi-agent
systems.
The pioneering axiomatic foundations of the principal formal ideas of the
most widely used models of ambiguity aversion were provided in contributions
by Gilboa and Schmeidler, and Schmeidler [7,18]. While the technical details of
the formal models of decision making under ambiguity aversion used in the
various applications vary, the broad intuitive content may be stated as follows.
1 For instance, Ghirardato and Mukerji [6,10] point out how the DM’s awareness that the
precise implication of some contingencies if inevitably left unforeseen, may lead to beliefs that have
a belief function [3,19] representation. The papers explain the Choquet decision rule as a
‘procedurally rational’ agent’s means of ‘handicapping’ the evaluation of an act to the extent the
estimate of its ‘expected performance’ is adversely aected by his imprecise knowledge of the odds.
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Suppose an agent’s subjective knowledge about the likelihood of contingent
events is consistent with more than one probability distribution, and further
that, what the agent knows does not inform him of a precise (second-order)
probability distribution over the set of ‘possible’ probabilities, we say then that
the agent’s beliefs about contingent events are characterized by ambiguity. If
ambiguous, 2 the agent’s beliefs are captured not by a unique probability
distribution in the standard Bayesian fashion but instead by a set of proba-
bilities. Thus not only is the particular outcome of an act uncertain but also the
expected payo of the action, since the payo may be measured with respect to
more than one probability. An agent’s ambiguity of belief about an event is
said to be greater, the greater the dierence between the maximum and mini-
mum probability estimate of the event consistent with the agent’s knowledge.
An ambiguity averse decision maker evaluates an act by the minimum expected
value that may be associated with it: the decision rule is to compute all possible
expected values for each action and then choose the act which has the best
minimum expected outcome. The idea being, ceteris paribus, the more an act is
aected adversely by ambiguity the less its appeal to the ambiguity averse
decision maker.
More formally, suppose that the DM’s domain of uncertainty is the finite
state space X  fxigNi1. The DM chooses between acts whose payos are state
contingent: e.g., a financial asset z; z : X ! R: The ambiguity averse DM’s
subjective belief is represented by a convex set of (standard, additive) proba-
bilities, denoted C: The ambiguity of the belief about an event E is measured by
the expression maxl2C lE ÿminl2C lE: Like in SEU, a utility function
u : R ! R; u0P 0; describes DM’s attitude to risk and wealth. The DM
evaluates Choquet expected utility of each act and chooses the act with the
highest evaluation. The Choquet expected utility of an act is simply the min-
imum of all possible ‘standard’ expected utility values obtained by measuring









2 To preempt misunderstandings it is emphasized that the term ‘ambiguity’ as used in this paper,
refers purely to the fuzzy perception of the likelihood subjectively associated with an event (e.g.,
when asked about his subjective estimate of the probability of an event, the agent replies, ‘It is
between 50% and 60%’). It does not refer to a lack of clarity in the description of contingent events
and actions. Also note, some authors and researchers refer to ambiguity variously as ‘vagueness’,
‘Knightian Uncertainty’ or even simply as ‘uncertainty’. As it is used in this paper, the word
uncertainty is simply the defining characteristic of any environment where the consequence of at
least one action is not known for certain.
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The Choquet expected utility of an act is just its standard expected utility
calculated with respect to a ‘minimizing probability’ corresponding to this
act. Hence, in the Choquet method, the DM’s appraisal is not only in-
formed by his knowledge of the odds but is also automatically adjusted
downwards to the extent it may be aected by the imprecision of his
knowledge.
2. The design of bilateral economic contracts
Typically, economic contracts involve arrangements about contingent
events. As such, the relevant trade-os hinge crucially on the likelihoods of
the relevant contingencies. Hence, it is a reasonable conjecture that the
domain of contractual transactions is one area of economics that is signifi-
cantly aected by agents knowledge of the odds. Thus contractual relations,
crucial to the organization of a modern economy, is a natural choice as a
particular focus of the research on the principal economic eects of ambi-
guity aversion. Bilateral contracts have been a recent focus of interest to AI
theorists as well [16]; for more on this, see the work of T. Sandholm and
associates, including his group’s ‘eCommitter’ project (http://ecom-
merce.cs.wustl.edu/ecommitter).
Economics studies mutually beneficial exchange between individuals. The
real world is dynamic and most mutually beneficial exchange takes place over
time. One party renders a good or service in the present in exchange for the
promise by another to render some good or service in the future. The basic way
of organizing these intertemporal exchanges is through the use of contracts.
Roughly put, the contracts which are commonly traded in an economy fall into
two categories: those which are used for organizing (co-ordinating) production/
consumption activity over time and those which are used for transferring (re-
distributing) income over time and across contingencies. The first category
includes all supply and delivery contracts between firms, between firms and
government, between firms and consumers, as well as all labor contracts. The
second category consists of financial contracts: insurance, bonds, equities, fu-
tures and options.
The way many crucial economic institutions have developed and function
is often best understood by studying the salient features of contracts and
contractual relations underpinning the particular institutions. Take for in-
stance, the first of the two categories of contracts described in the preceding
paragraph and the modern theory of the firm. Why firms exist and what
productive processes and activities are typically integrated within the
boundaries of a firm, are largely explained by the nature of incompleteness of
supply and delivery contracts. A contract may be said to be incomplete if the
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contingent instructions included in the contract do not exhaust all possible
contingencies. However, incompleteness of contracts has largely been a puzzle
to the standard theory. This has prompted researchers in recent times to
consider alternative paradigms in their search for appropriate theories of
incompleteness: e.g., Mukerji [11] showed that contractual incompleteness can
be explained by ambiguity aversion. This finding in turn explains some widely
observed ‘realities’ about the organization of firms that were previously dif-
ficult to come to terms with. The formal analysis in [11] basically involves a
reconsideration of the canonical model of a vertical relationship (i.e., a re-
lationship in which one firm’s output is an input in the other firm’s pro-
duction activity) between two contracting firms under the assumption that the
agents’ common information about the contingent events is ambiguous and
that the agents are ambiguity averse. Next, we review this exercise with a
simple example.
Consider two risk neutral firms, B and S. B is an automobile manufac-
turer planning to introduce a new line of models. B wishes to purchase a
consignment of car bodies (tailor-made for the new models) from S: The
firms may sign a contract at some initial date 0 specifying the terms of trade
of the sale at date 2; that is, whether trade takes place and at what price.
The value of the consignment to the buyer, v, its (marginal) cost of pro-
duction c, and hence, the tradeable surplus vÿ c, are contingent upon the
state of nature realized in date 1. There are three possible contingencies
x0;xb;xs; with corresponding tradeable surpluses s0; sb; ss: After date 0 but
before date 1, S invests in research for a pie that will eciently cast car
bodies required for the new model while B invests eort to put together an
appropriate marketing campaign for the new model. The investments aect
the likelihood of realizing a particular state of nature. Each firm may choose
between a low and a high level of investment eort. The investments are not
contractible per se (i.e., it is assumed that it is not possible to draft contracts
which contain perfect descriptions, verifiable ex post in courts, of the re-
quired investment eort) but the terms of trade specification in the contracts
may be made as contingency specific as required. In the case that the con-
tract is incomplete and an ‘unmentioned’ event arises with sure potential for
surplus it is commonly anticipated by the parties that trade will be negoti-
ated ex post and the surplus split evenly. Consider the two possibilities X
and Y : X there is a longer list of reservations for the new model than for
comparable makes and at a price higher than those for comparable makes;
(Y) the variable cost of production of car body is low. The state of the
world x0 is characterized by the fact that both the statements are false. At
xb; X is true but not Y; conversely, at xs; X is false but Y holds. Cor-
respondingly suppose s0 < sb  ss. The common belief about the likelihood
of xb is at the margin aected (positively) more by B choosing the high
investment eort over low eort than by S doing the same, while the
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opposite is true of xs: As is customary, we define an (first best) ecient
investment profile as one that would be chosen if investment eort were
verifiable and contractible. 3
Bear in mind the allowance of being able to write complete contingent
contracts and the institutional setting of a vertical inter-firm relationship. As
is formally argued in [11], given all this and that decision makers are SEU
maximizers, the non-verifiability of investment will not impede eciency. In
our example, for instance, a contract which distinguishes the three contin-
gencies and sets prices that rewards B suciently higher at xb than at other
contingencies (and similarly rewards S at xs) will enforce the first best eort
profile. The general conclusion is that if agents are SEU maximizers then an
incomplete contract which implements an inecient profile cannot be an
optimal contract. 4 Such a contract can never be the optimal because it will be
possible to find a complete contract that dominates it (i.e., a contract that
obtains higher ex ante payos for both parties). However, this conclusion is
overturned if agents are ambiguity averse. The logic of this may be seen by re-
evaluating the above example with the sole amendment that agents are am-
biguity averse. To provide sucient incentive to take the ecient investment
the ex post payos in the contract have to treat the two firms asymmetrically
at xb and xs; for B the payo is higher at xb than at xs; while it is the other
way around for S. This implies that the firms would, in eect, use dierent
probability distributions to evaluate their expected payos. From the set of
probabilities embodying the firms’ symmetric information B measures its
3 Some clarification of terminology might be useful at this point for the non-economist reader.
The word profile is used in the same sense as in game theory; it is simply a selection of strategies,
one for each player in the game. In our example, the two firms are mutually playing a game in
which strategies are levels of (investment) eort. Eciency is a fundamental concept in economics,
used as a criterion for judging the desirability of a particular allocation of resources (say,
investment eort) in an economy. Roughly put, and especially in the current context, an allocation
is ecient if it maximizes the total surplus for all individuals: the reference is to the size of the whole
pie rather than a particular division of the pie. It is important to understand that an allocation may
be individually rational, i.e., it maximizes the utility of each individual separately, taking into
account the relevant constraints (e.g. individual incentives), without being ecient. For instance, in
the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma game, shown below, the (unique) equilibrium strategy profile,
Confess;Confessf g, does not allow an ecient allocation of the available payos:
Not confess Confess
Not confess 10,10 ÿ10; 11
Confess 11;ÿ10 0,0
4 In this context a contract is optimal, if given the constraint of non-verifiability of investment
eort, no other contract exists that is individually profitable to both parties to the contract and
make the parties undertake an investment profile that would generate a greater expected (joint)
surplus.
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payos using a probability distribution that puts a relatively higher weight on
xs than the distribution S thinks prudent to check its payo against. Con-
sequently, the sum of the expected payos will fall short of the expected total
surplus – there is a ‘virtual loss’ of the expected surplus. It follows that if this
‘loss’ is large enough the participation constraints will break, i.e., the sharp-
ness of incentives makes payos to each firm so risky that they are happier not
signing on to the contract at all, thereby making such a contract impossible.
An incomplete contract, say the null contract (one that leaves all allocation of
contingent surplus to ex post negotiation), is not similarly vulnerable to
ambiguity aversion. Such a contract will lead to a proportionate division of
surplus at each contingency, implying that each firm will use the same
probability to evaluate its payos. Additivity of the standard expectation
operator then ensures that no virtual loss occurs. As is shown formally in [11],
from all this it follows that there will be parametric configurations for which
an incomplete contract even though only implementing an inecient invest-
ment profile, is not dominated by any other contract. Under such circum-
stances the market transaction, if maintained, may justifiably be conducted
with an ‘inecient’ incomplete contract. The ‘ineciency’ of the market
transaction would also explain why it might be abandoned in favor of vertical
integration, i.e., a firm is instituted by integrating the upstream and down-
stream productive activities.
Why might an explanation like the one given above be of interest? The final
section of [11] discusses historic instances of vertical mergers and empirical
regularities about supply contracts that are understandable on the basis of
ambiguity aversion, but are not well explained by ‘physical’ transactions costs
of writing contingent details into contracts. A recurrent claim among business
people is that they integrate vertically because of uncertainty in input supply.
This idea has always caused diculties for economists (see, for instance [2])
who have been unable to rationalize it and have generally regarded it as
misguided. The analysis in the present paper explains how the idea of ambi-
guity aversion provides one precise understanding of the link between un-
certainty and vertical integration. Finally, at a more abstract level, a
significant insight obtained is that even if there were no direct costs to con-
ditioning contractual terms on ‘finely described’ events, one may well end up
with only ‘coarse’ arrangements because the value of fine-tuning is not robust
to the agents’ misgivings that they have only a vague assessment of the
likelihoods of the relevant ‘fine’ events. The understanding that how well the
DM thinks he knows the relevant likelihoods explains what events are used to
condition contractual instructions, is a novel contribution of the theory of
ambiguity aversion to the debate about the foundations of incomplete con-
tracts, and, the economic theory of contract design. The understanding is
indeed novel, since to an SEU maximizer the quality or accuracy of his belief
does not matter.
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3. Financial contracts and financial markets
In a pioneering contribution, Dow and Werlang [4] identified an important
implication of the CEU model with regard to optimal financial decision
making. The paper showed that, in a static model with one risky and one
riskless asset, given ambiguous beliefs and ambiguity aversion, there will be a
multiplicity of asset prices that support the optimal choice of a riskless port-
folio, giving rise to what is commonly called a ‘bid-ask spread’ (i.e., a gap
between the highest price a buyer will want to bid for an asset and the mini-
mum the seller will settle for or ask). The intuition behind this finding is ex-
plained in the following example.
Suppose a risk neutral investor is considering a transaction involving a unit
of a financial asset z with contingent payos. Specifically, the investor is
comparing the expected payo from buying one unit of the asset to that from
short selling one unit of the asset. The following table indicates the (non-
additive) probability describing the common information about the uncertainty
and the contingent payos:
The expected payo of buying an unit of z; let us call it the act zb; CEzb
is obtained by taking expectations w.r.t. the relevant minimizing probability
in the core of m: Notice, the payo from the act zb is lower at xL than
at xH: Hence, the relevant minimizing probability when evaluating CEzb
is that probability in C puts most weight on xL. Therefore, CEzb 
minl2C
P
zb xi l xi f g  0:6 1 0:4 3  1:8: On the other hand, the
payo from going short on a unit of z (the act zs is higher at xL than at xH. In
other words, buying and selling are non-comonotonic acts. Hence, the relevant
minimizing probability when evaluating CE zb is that probability in C
that puts most weight on xH: Thus, CEzs  minl2C
P
zs xi l xi f g 
0:3 ÿ1   0:7 ÿ3   ÿ2:4: An ‘economic’ interpretation would run as
follows. Given the ambiguity in the investor’s subjective assessment of the
uncertainty, more than one probability is consistent with his knowledge. Being
ambiguity averse, he ‘shades’ the valuation to the extent it may be aected by
the ambiguity. The switch in the relevant minimizing probability implicit in the
evaluation when comparing a buying position to a selling, is simply a reflection
of the ‘shading eect’.
It is evident from our computations that if the price of the asset z were to lie
in the open interval 1:8; 2:4, then the investor would strictly prefer a zero
position to either going short or buying. Unlike in the case of unambiguous
Possible states xL xH
Non-additive probability m mxL  0:3 mxH  0:4
State contingent payo to buying 1 3
State contingent payo to selling ÿ1 ÿ3
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beliefs (i.e., SEU) there is no single price at which to switch from buying to
selling. Taking a zero position on the risky asset has the unique advantage that
its evaluation is not aected by ambiguity. Thus price has to rise (fall) su-
ciently to allow the investor feel secure in going short (long) by meeting the test
of his conservative estimate – ‘shading’ of valuations due to ambiguity aversion
is what results in the ‘inertia’ zone. It is however important to note that Dow
and Werlang’s demonstration is simply a statement about optimal portfolio
choice corresponding to exogenously given prices. Their result is not a de-
scription of an equilibrium since the model is not closed to obtain asset prices
endogenously.
A financial contract is a claim to an income stream – hence the logic of the
financial markets: by exchanging such claims agents change the shapes of their
income streams, obtaining a more even consumption across time and the un-
certain contingencies. A financial market is said to be complete if contingent
payos from the dierent marketed securities are varied enough to span all the
contingencies. However, in just about every financial market in the real world
the span is less than the full set of contingencies, i.e., the markets are incom-
plete. The primary implication of incompleteness is that agents may transfer
income only across a limited set of contingencies and are thus left exposed to
risk in a suboptimal manner. Incompleteness of financial markets is a com-
pelling feature because it explains crucial facts about the working of financial
and competitive markets that would be impossible to explain without assuming
incompleteness. Indeed, this characteristic is the fundamental inspiration for
the most comprehensive model of the market economy: general equilibrium
with incomplete markets (GEI) (see [15] for a survey). Nevertheless, relatively
little has been accomplished in the way of formally establishing what precisely
leads to the incompleteness.
Mukerji and Tallon [12] apply ambiguity aversion to provide an explanation
of the incompleteness of financial markets. More particularly, the paper fo-
cuses on the question, ‘‘What prevents the typical bond-equity finance econ-
omy from oering sucient opportunities for Pareto optimal risk sharing? In
other words, why should the theorems of general equilibrium with incomplete
markets (GEI), rather than general equilibrium with complete markets (GE),
be a more compelling description of the typical bond-equity economy?’’ To
analyze the question, the paper considers a stylized bond-equity economy,
which though incomplete per se, has a rich enough set of assets available for
trade such that given standard assumptions about behavior under uncertainty,
the equilibrium allocation would arbitrarily approximate a complete market
(GE) allocation. It is shown, however, that given ‘sucient’ ambiguity aver-
sion, a certain subset of the available assets will not be actually traded in
equilibrium, even though available. Hence it is proved that, given sucient
ambiguity aversion, provided the non-traded securities are non-redundant,
equilibrium allocation of the bond-equity economy is a GEI equilibrium. This
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shows how ambiguity aversion may endogenously limit the scope of risk
sharing obtainable through the bonds/equities actually traded in a typical
economy, and therefore, explain why the actual behavior of such an economy
is better described by the GEI model, rather than the GE model.
The underlying objective of the formal analysis in [12] is to identify the class
of assets whose trade is vulnerable to ambiguity aversion: assets that will be
traded if agents are subjective expected utility maximizers but not if the agents’
common beliefs about payos of the assets is suciently ambiguous and the
agents are ambiguity averse. It is found that what determines an asset’s vul-
nerability to ambiguity aversion is whether its payos have an idiosyncratic
component, i.e., if at least some component of the payo is independent of the
realized endowment (which includes, primarily, wage-income payments) vector
and of the payo of any other asset as well. 5 It turns out that if, (1) the range
of variation of the payo’s idiosyncratic component is ‘large’ relative to the
range of the variation of the component correlated with the endowment vector
and, (2) the ambiguity of the agents’ common belief about the idiosyncratic
component is suciently high, then the asset will not be traded in any general
equilibrium of the finance economy. Moreover, we also find that the eect of
idiosyncracy cannot simply be ‘washed away’ by the standard techniques of
diversification relying on the laws of large numbers, as it would be if the agents’
beliefs were not ambiguous.
The analysis and results in [12] suggest that if the increase in uncertainty
were suciently great then trade in a certain subset of the assets will thin out
(in particular, trade in those corporate bonds and forward contracts on equities
for which the ratio of the range of variation of the idiosyncratic component to
the range of variation due to the economic shocks is greater). History of fi-
nancial markets is replete with episodes of increase in uncertainty leading to a
thinning out of trade (or even seizing up completely) peculiarly in assets such as
high yield corporate bonds (‘junk’ bonds) and bonds issued in ‘emerging
markets’ (vis., Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia). Also, it seems
eminently demonstrable that the high risk bonds which appear to be so sen-
sitive to attacks of uncertainty are precisely those bonds which have high id-
iosyncratic components in their payos. Thus the theory of ambiguity aversion
5 The presence of idiosyncratic risk reflects the belief that payo from a financial asset is not only
aected by some of the same shocks that aect individual households’ endowment income and
common to many assets but also by risks specific to each asset. While most firms’ profits are
naturally aected by aggregate or sectorial demand shifts and supply shocks, other factors, more
idiosyncratic to the firm, do typically matter. For instance, suppose a firm introduces a new product
line, an innovation, into the market. In such a case, typically, it is not just the shocks commonly
aecting firms in the same trade that will aect the sales of the new product but also more (brand)
specific elements, e.g., whether (or not) the innovation has a ‘special’ appeal for the consumers.
Another example of idiosyncratic shocks, are shocks to firms’ internal organizational capabilities.
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provides an endogenously generated ‘natural’ explanation of why only this
certain class of assets, and not all assets, will be aected by the increase in
uncertainty. The explanation is also useful in providing a novel understanding
of the role of certain institutions of financial contracting in facilitating the
transaction of corporate bonds. For AI the findings would be of interest to
those who research the ability of securities markets to aggregate beliefs ([13] is
the pioneering work in this area, though consult Wellman’s web page, cited in
Section 1, for some recent applications of the idea in AI). In particular, the
analysis and results in [12] suggest the aggregation may be problematic when
the securities in question have idiosyncratic components, as many securities do.
4. Strategic decision making
In recent years game theory, the theory of strategic decision making, has
come to be the basic building block of economic theorizing. Naturally, econ-
omists working with the ideas of ambiguity aversion have increasingly sought
to incorporate the ideas into game theoretic analysis. While the theoretical
work involved in making a success of this marriage is far from complete, there
has already appeared some very innovative work in applying the newly ob-
tained theoretical framework to explain sundry economic phenomena. In this
section we review one such example.
The example relates to the theory of auctions. As is widely acknowledged,
analysis of auctions is perhaps the most ‘public’ face of game theory in eco-
nomics. No less important is the fact that the principles of auction theory lie at
the very heart of the theory of regulatory design, and more generally, mech-
anism design. Increasingly, auction theory is seen to provide important insight
into the design of multiagent systems (see, apart from the citations and remarks
in the introductory section, the work of Wurman (http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/
faculty/wurman/publications.html), and Sandholm (http://www.cs.wustl.edu/
sandholm) including his group’s eAuctionHouse, (http://ecommerce.
cs.wustl.edu/eAuctionHouse). Traditional analysis of auctions assumes that
each bidder’s beliefs about opponents’ valuations are represented by a prob-
ability measure. Lo [9] examines the consequences of relaxing this assumption,
by allowing for ambiguous beliefs and ambiguity aversion, in the first and
second price sealed bid auctions where all participants are risk neutral, each
bidder’s valuation of the good being sold is known only to himself and is in-
dependent of others’ valuations. Under a fairly general parametric specification
of the model it is shown that the first price auction will be (strictly) preferred to
the second price auction, by the seller. The result is of substantial interest, at
least in part, because the traditional (SEU) analysis asserts that, given risk-
neutral bidders, the seller should essentially be indierent between the pros-
pects of the two auction formats. A brief intuition of the result may be given as
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follows. First, recall that the essential feature of sealed bid auctions is that each
bidder submits a single bid to the auctioneer and the bid is not revealed to
other bidders. In the first price format, the bidder who submits the highest bid
wins and pays the price he bids. In a second price auction, the bidder who
submits the highest bid wins but he is only required to pay a price equal to the
second highest bid. As is well known, in a second price auction, irrespective of
one’s beliefs about others’ valuations and bidding strategies, it is a (weakly)
dominant strategy to bid one’s true valuation. Bidding higher than one’s own
valuation, in a second price auction, increases the probability of winning only
when the consequence is that one ends up paying a price greater than his
valuation. Similarly, bidding below one’s valuation is of no use: it decreases
one’s chances of winning when winning is gainful and does not aect the price
paid in any case. However, beliefs do aect the bidding strategy in the first
price auction. When bidders are considering the optimal bid in the first price
auction, ambiguity aversion makes them behave as if it is likely that their
competitors have a high valuation, thereby leading to a more aggressive bid-
ding strategy.
All this tells that if one were to take ambiguity aversion into account then a
seller should proceed to design a dierent auction mechanism than what he
would given standard notions of decision making under uncertainty.
5. Conclusion
The research program surveyed aims to demonstrate how reformulating
aspects of the decision making under uncertainty can yield very novel insights
into the working of vital economic institutions such as the markets for con-
tracts and securities. As was pointed out in Section 1, the remodeling of de-
cision making under uncertainty drew on insights that are well-known to AI
researchers since very similar considerations apply in many contexts of interest
in AI problems. It is hoped that the new research in AI which proposes to draw
on the lessons from analyses of market behavior of agents in uncertain envi-
ronments will find it of interest to note that the nature of such market inter-
actions are aected quite significantly when we consider an arguably more
‘realistic’ (especially in AI contexts) model of decision making under uncer-
tainty.
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